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People often talk silently to themselves, engaging in what is called inner speech,
internal conversation, inner dialogue, self  talk and so on. This seems to be an





190a and Sophist 263e), who regarded thought as inner speech. The
American pragmatists thought the inner dialogue was the defining feature of
the self  (Archer 2003, pp. 53–92). For them the self  is an internal community or
network, communicating within itself  in a field of  meaning.
The idea that ordinary language is the language of  thought however is not the
only linquistic theory of  thought. Since Saint Augustine there has been the idea
that thought is itself  a language of  pure abstractions. This “mental language” as
it was called differs from ordinary language by consisting solely of  meanings,
i.e. as signifieds without signifiers to use Saussure’s language (Ashworth 2003).
This hypothesis peaked in the writings of  William of  Occam and declined
when Hobbes introduced a purely computational, hedonistic theory of  thought
(Normore 2005).
A second competitor to the ordinary language theory of  thought is the
“mentalese” hypothesis of  Noam Chomsky (1968) and Jerry Fodor (1975). This
approach, which sometimes uses the computer as a metaphor for the mind,
resembles the Scholastic’s theory in envisioning a purely abstract language of
thought. Whatever processes of  ordinary language might accompany it are
viewed as epiphenomenal, gloss or what might be called “fluff.” Ordinary
language, according to this view, is a pale shadow of  the actual language of
thought. In addition mentalese is regarded as both innate and unconscious. It is
a faculty that is claimed to be present at birth and one which operates below
the awareness of  the mind.
There are then three language of  thought hypotheses, the ordinary language
or inner speech version, the now marginalized Augustine-Occam mental lan-
guage and the computer-based, Chomsky-Fodor theory of  mentalese.
There seem to be no comparisons of  the Scholastic and the mentalese theories
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between the ordinary language theory and that of  mentalese (for two collections
see Carruthers and Boucher 1998 and Preston 1997). A major weak spot of
mentalese is that, being unconscious, there is no empirical way of  verifying it. The
weak spot of  the inner speech approach is that there are several examples of
non-linguistic thought, e.g. in infants, animals, brain damaged people and
ordinary people under conditions of  high speed thought.
Still, all three of  these language of  thought hypotheses are alive and under
discussion in contemporary thought. On another occasion I will make a com-
parison of  all three, arguing that the inner speech approach is the most useful.
On this occasion, though, I will confine myself  to the analysis of  inner speech,
attempting to approach it in a linguistic manner.
Inner speech is a streamlined version of  outer speech, characterized by short
cuts and speaker peculiarities. (A useful collection is Vocate 1994. Also see Vygot-
sky 1987; Hurlburt 1990, 1993: Johnson 1994; Wiley 1994; Tomlinson 2000;
Kinsbourne 2000; Archer 2003; Collins 2004: Scheff  2000; Morin 2005). One
scholar, building on Vygotsky, distinguished four features: (a) silence, (b) syntactical
ellipses or short-cuts, (c) semantic embeddedness, i.e. highly condensed word
meanings and (d) egocentricity or highly personal word meanings ( Johnson 1994,
pp. 177–179). But even though all people seem to practice inner speech, there is
little known about it as a language, other than the broadly defining characteristics.
There are no systematic studies of  vocabulary or syntax. In this respect it is like
dreams. We all have them, but they are so private and vague they resist analysis.
In addition examples or texts of  inner speech are rarely found in the literature.
Vygotsky (1987) gave no examples, even though his analysis, presumably based on
his own self  awareness, was quite illuminating. I will supply examples based
mainly on self  observation. As I present them it will be obvious that Vygotsky
could have easily given similar examples and that they would have made his path
breaking analysis a lot richer.
Despite the fuzziness of  inner speech, I will look at it as though it were an
actual language, bearing similarities to ordinary or “outer” language. And I will
use ideas from Saussure to see the extent to which it can be treated as a language.
To do this I will have to make several compromises and adjustments, but this
seems to be unavoidable. I am aware that Saussure did not catch on in linguistics
and is mainly of  historical interest in that discipline. But in cultural studies, where
the linguistic analogy is dominant, Saussure is the central figure. And my interest
is mainly in the status of  inner speech in cultural studies, not in linguistics as such.
In this paper, then, I will draw on Saussure’s major theses (de Saussure 1957)
concerning language, among which were the following. (1) Language has two
axes: a syntagmatic one on which linguistic syntax unfolds, and a paradigmatic
one on which we choose words from among their similars and opposites. (2)
There are two ways of  approaching language temporally. We can study it dia-
chronically, as it originates and changes over time, or, as he preferred, synchron-
ically, as it exists in the present moment. (3) We can define word meanings
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referentially, by their relation to some extra-linguistic object, or, as he chose,
differentially, by their relation to the other words in the language. (4) We can
distinguish between empirical speech (“parole”) and formal language (“langue”),
the latter being a smoothed-over version of  the way people actually speak. Lin-
guistics, he said, should study language, not speech.
I will show that inner speech does not fit well into Saussure’s notion of  a public
language. It is too personalized, private and self  styled. On the other hand Saus-
sure’s conceptual scheme sheds light on what is now something of  a dark conti-
nent in human consciousness. This set of  questions reveals a unique linguistic
structure and shows how inner speech functions as a guide or mapping device
through life.
 
THE TWO AXES: PARADIGMATIC AND SYNTAGMATIC
 
Saussure distinguished two principles or axes along which the flow of  language
proceeds. The syntagmatic, which had long been discussed in linguistics, is that
of  sentence formation or syntax. The paradigmatic, which had not been singled
out before Saussure, is that of  word selection. The speaker must choose each word
from among a batch of  words, all somewhat similar in meaning. And the speaker
must also pay attention to words that contrast, particularly binary opposites.
These two axes are structures that inform meaning. On the syntagmatic axis,
ideas cannot be elaborated without syntax, otherwise they will be in the much
weaker and less flexible form of  pidgin language (Bickerton 1990, pp. 118–122).
And on the paradigmatic axis, words get much of  their meaning from their
partners or associates, i.e. similars and opposites. These latter are unspoken in a
sentence, so they function as an implicit verbal context.
Inner speech too has both axes, but they are more relaxed and less controlling
than in outer language. On the syntagmatic axis, the syntax of  inner speech is
abbreviated and simplified. Vygotsky (1987, pp. 266–268) pointed out that the
subject of  a sentence along with its modifiers is usually omitted. Like the language
people use in a telegram, this seems to be a simple matter of  economy. Why keep
saying “I” when you know the subject is always “I.” Just omit the subject, or as
Vygotsky said, “predicate” the sentence.




. If  you are
getting hungry, thinking about meeting your spouse at the end of  a work day,
planning your route home, or thinking about cooking, you might get the imagery
of  your favorite store. Perhaps even of  the produce sections and meat counter. If
this visual (and olfactory) imagery enters your head you already have a stimulus
that can function syntactically. At this point you can think the simple, one-word
sentence: “Shop!,” and say the whole thing. You don’t need the subject, since it’s
the usual “I”. And you do not need modifiers or clauses, since the store imagery
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word “shop” is all you need to remind yourself  to (a) stop at Whole Foods market
on the way home, (b) pick up a green vegetable, (c) buy two cuts of  lean meat, (d)
some milk, (e) and maybe some wine, (f ) and possibly a low calorie dessert.
The abbreviated syntax of  inner speech seems to resemble pidgin language in
its lack of  crucial parts of  speech. If  it were actually pidgin it could not handle
complex ideas. But the syntax of  inner speech is just as involved, if  not more so,
as ordinary speech. The difference is that inner speech is condensed and folded
into itself. Still, all the parts of  speech are there, and they could be produced in
all their complexity merely by unfolding the internal utterance.
Writers do this all the time when their thought process gets to a highly illumi-
nating insight. They stop the stream of  thought, re-run the idea (and the internal
language) that contained the insight, and sometimes utter the insightful sentence
aloud to themselves. But when they speak it out they do not use the elliptical
syntax of  inner speech. They switch to the syntax of  outer speech, which is not
abbreviated. In doing this they stretch out or unfold the syntax that was implicit
in the insightful thought in the first place. The thought was so over-simplified that
it looked like pidgin or infantile language. But when the writer re-played the
thought to capture the fullness of  its meaning, it became clear that the elaborate
syntax was there all the time. It got folded into itself  for economy, not because of
the thinker’s deficiency (see the “thinking aloud” research, e.g. Ericsson 2001).
Inner speech also seems to resemble Basil Bernstein’s “restricted code” (Bern-
stein 1971, pp. 76–94; Tomlinson 2000, p. 125). Bernstein, who studied the
speech patterns of  different social classes in England, distinguished the relatively
concrete, local and syntactically thin code of  the less educated from the more
abstract, universal and syntactically rich code of  the more educated classes,
although both seem to be able to use each other’s codes at times. He called the
former “restricted” and the latter “elaborated.” But the resemblance of  inner
speech to the restricted code is misleading. Inner speech seems restricted because
it is efficient to speak to oneself  in this way. But this is merely the way the crushed
or condensed feature of  inner speech looks—not the way it has to be.
The uneducated, at least in Bernstein’s theory, speak in a simplified code
because this fits their local lives and modest educations. Perhaps some cannot
speak in the elaborated code. Or, more likely, they use the restricted code as a
mask of  distrust in speaking to middle class people. But many people using inner
speech in this way do so out of  simple convenience, and they could easily translate
inner speech into a more elaborate code. In fact if  someone said “a penny for
your thoughts” they would automatically translate them from the abbreviated to
a more elaborate code.
All these abbreviations and short-cuts speed up inner speech, making it a more
efficient cognitive resource. The best scholarly estimate of  this speed at the present
time is ten times as fast as outer speech (Korba 1986; 1990). This speed may vary
somewhat depending on the topic of  internal conversation, but its rapidity
explains how inner speech can keep up with rapidly changing problems. If  you
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wake up to a burning house in the middle of  the night, you can plan your escape
route, using high-speed inner speech, just as fast as you need to. There are also
probably times when one reacts by habit or by some even more physiological
response. Then inner speech may be bypassed entirely. But for most problems,
inner speech is fast enough to keep up with the demands of  the situation.
The elliptical syntax of  inner speech, then, is one of  its strengths. Its speed
creates a powerful intellectual resource, making it in some ways more useful than
outer speech. Not that the two are completely distinct. During outer speech or
interaction all parties are simultaneously engaged in inner speech. This process
interprets what has been said and rehearses what might be said. At these times
inner speech probably runs the usual ten to one ratio, allowing it enough tempo-
ral play to digest and direct one’s contribution to the conversation. But inner
speech goes on privately too, even when there is no conversation with others. At
these times it can be seen most dramatically how this speech is useful for fast
action.
The paradigmatic axis too has its peculiarities, including condensed and ego-
centric semantic principles. Along with abbreviated syntax, this semantics allows
us to use fewer words. For one thing the stock of  vocabulary is much smaller than
in outer language. As Mead says of  inner speech, “The mechanism that we use
for this process is words, vocal gestures. And we need, of  course, only a very few
of  these as compared with those we need when talking to others (1936, p. 381).”
One is not impressing others, or for that matter capturing precise nuances of
language. This precision can be obtained later with ordinary language, assuming
one needs it.
And if  one repeats or over-uses key words, even though this might be a defi-
ciency in writing or in conversation, it can work just fine in the internal conver-
sation. Again, you want the job done, and the appropriate language is whatever
works best. This means the vocabulary can be quite small, and the same words
can be used over and over again. Also adjectives and other modifiers can usually
be dispensed with. If  you say “girl” (or “guy”) you need not add the word “cute,”
assuming you might want to. This can be handled by visual imagery. You picture
a cute girl or guy or even turn on the feeling of  “cuteness,” making it an emotion
rather than a visual image or word.
In this way the overtones of  key words can become condensed, allowing
them to carry large numbers of  other words or their many possible meanings. If
someone makes me angry and I say to myself, “bastard,” this can cover many
possible reasons for the anger. The person might have flagrantly wronged me, e.g.
more or less stolen something of  mine; they might have violated exchange rules
by not taking their turn in doing me a favor; they might have insulted me in word
or deed; or they may have harmed someone dear to me.
To specify a particular grievance all you need is the word “bastard” along with
a specifier. This specifier can be a visual image of  the look on their face, an
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their action—or even some fringe words, (e.g. “lying bastard) that are implicit in
the shadow of  the main word. The actual condensational processes are usually
too complex to dissect, but we can see how one or a few words can be used for
many, and how this helps makes inner speech both lean and fast.
Egocentricity also pervades these verbal peculiarities. One is one’s own diction-
ary, i.e. one can use words in ways that are peculiar to ones own emotional habits,
desires or personal slang. Each person has his or her own biography, and along
this road there are lots of  major, sometimes life-changing, events. These events are
the stuff  of  one’s personal mythology.




 They are per-
vaded with what William James and Charles Horton Cooley called “self  feeling.”
This is a glow or mana or charisma, usually positive but sometimes negative, that
attaches itself  to the things closest to us: our persons, our bodies, our prize pos-
sessions and the people who mean the most to us.
When words get their meaning from events peculiar to us, circumscribed by
our own intra-subjectivity and completely meaningless in interpersonal conversa-
tion, we are in the house of  egocentric vocabulary. These packed-with-meaning
expressions give our inner speech its emotional flexibility and contribute to its
lightning speed. They also show that some things, which are easily handleable in
inner speech, cannot be introduced in outer speech at all. This is our own, private
little world. It is nobody’s business but our own, and it does tasks for us that could
not be accomplished in any other way.
In sum, Saussure’s two axes certainly do exist in inner speech. But not as he
described them in outer speech. His syntagmatic and paradigmatic axes were
heaped with meaning and complexity. In contrast, those of  inner speech are both
simpler and more complex. They are simpler in both semantics and syntax, using
fewer words and fewer parts of  speech. On the other hand they incorporate so
many extra-linguistic elements—visual imagery, tactile sensations, emotion, kines-
thetics, smells, tastes and sounds—that they are far more complex than Saussure’s
two axes.
So far, then, inner speech is partly responsive to linguistic concepts and partly
not. This set of  mixed effects will continue as I look at the other three Saussurean









 a language (specifically)—because its linguistic species has




When Saussure compared the history and systematics of  language, he framed the
problem in terms of  outer language. In that medium linguistic change is cultural
change. But for inner language change is not cultural, since this language is
ensconced in someone’s psychology. This change is an aspect of  human development
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or the life cycle. And since each person’s inner speech is something of  a unique
tongue, each would have a unique history—though there might also be a shared
history based on physical and cultural evolution. In any case it is clear that the
history vs. systematics issue would have to be re-defined to apply to inner speech.
There are two ways of  looking at the shared history of  inner speech: phyloge-
netically in the species and ontogenetically in the infant. The two approaches
converge in suggesting that inner speech may have come gradually or in stages.
The stages and what they mean are a major feature of  the history.
I will just touch on the phylogenesis of  inner speech, since this process is known
only in broad contours. Still it was almost certainly a case of  the “me” coming at
an earlier time period than the “I.” Early human communities, to speak very
generally, had a highly corporate or integrated character, with little emphasis on
the individual or the individual point of  view. This social absorption of  individuals
would seem to encourage the me, the passive self, and virtually disallow the I, the
originating or agentic self. The community, which is all-important in early pre-
historical periods, would dominate the mind, including inner speech.
The “I” would be quite indistinct and undeveloped until the rise of  the
individual in urbanized societies. An early example was classical Greece from








 early Homer has no
references to psychological processes or elements of  the self—no thinking, remem-
bering, deciding or anticipating, etc. When these processes come up they are
explained either as physiological or as the voices of  the Gods. The later inter-
pellations of  Homer however, i.e. passages obviously written by later writers, do
begin to talk about the mind, supplying terms for the major internal processes as
well as for the self  (Snell 1982 and Onions 1988).
The more recent urban civilizations of  the industrialization period seem to
sharpen individuality even more and thus give more edge to the “I” component
of  inner speech (Borkenau 1981). The egocentricity of  ordinary inner speech
seems to undergo a qualitative transformation at this point.
In broad strokes then it seems clear that humans became more self  conscious
and individualized as societies moved toward the urban industrial model. The
history of  inner speech is one in which the “me” preceded the “I.”
Turning to ontogenesis, children develop listening skills before speaking skills,
suggesting that they are objects before becoming subjects. They decode before
they can encode language. In a similar vein they learn the word “me” before the
word “I.” They refer to themselves in the objective case as “me” or by using their
given name, examples being “me hungry” or “Janey want cookie.” “I” comes,
somewhat laboriously, long after the word “me.”
I will argue that this is more than just words. The small child not only thinks
of  him- or herself  as me, this person is also confined to the me niche of  inner
speech. The child functions as a me in the thought process, with the other pole
of  the conversation being somewhat out of  reach, though not out of  earshot.
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“private speech” (Diaz and Berk 1992), they create a similar objectivization of  self.
They are speaking to themselves as though taking the role of  another, often that
of  the mother.
The staging of  inner speech, such that some capacities come before others,
helps explain these developmental oddities. Perhaps the infant discovers the “I”
in something akin to Jacques Lacan’s “mirror stage” (Lacan 1977). For Lacan this
discovery can occur in an actual mirror, or it can occur is a more diffuse experi-
ential setting he seems to think of  as a social mirror. As he puts it, “the idea of
the mirror should be understood as an object which reflects—not just the visible,
but also what is heard, touched and willed by the child” (1949, p. 567; Rose 1982,
p. 30). Lacan does not explain how what is heard, touched or willed might act as
a mirror or reflective device. But I think his formulation is open to hearing the
voice of  others, especially the close caretakers—in other words to Mead’s role-
taking (Wiley 2003).
Lacan’s reference to the child’s will is reminiscent of  Peirce’s idea that the child
first discovers his or her self  by making errors of  desire (Peirce 1984, p. 202). In
Peirce’s example the child is entranced by the fire and, ignoring the advice of
others, sticks its finger into it. When the finger is burned the infant immediately
wants to know how it happened. He or she backtrails to find the cause. And what
is discovered is an activity that the child was not quite conscious of  before. The
infant discovers that he or she has an inner energy that can want and seek after
given goals, such as the more complete experience of  the fire. This discovery
could be attributed to something or someone else living in the child and control-
ling it. But Peirce thinks the discovery leads directly to a now visible, internal
principle that is an actor or agent, or more simply a self.
To discover that you are a self  must clear up all sorts of  problems. You half
knew it before, because you were using it. You were making things happen, even
though they seemed to be happening to you. You had a visceral if  indistinct sense
of  your self  all along. In fact you probably had been listening to that, sometimes
bewildering, self  in the internal conversation for quite a while. This self  is the
other end of  the inner dialogue. That dialogical partner is not your mother or
some outside authority; it is another part of  you. And the conversation is private,
no one can hear it, and you can talk about anything you want.
This discovery of  self  is a crucial step in the fleshing out of  inner speech, for
now the person has control of  both ends of  the conversation and can use it to its
full potential. As I see it, the “I” has been added to the “me.” The child has
moved grammatically from third to first person. And the old “me cookie,” “Janey





The progression from me to I is the movement from what might be called
precursors of  inner speech to inner speech itself. Piaget and Vygotsky thought
full-fledged inner speech began about age four, although they did not refer to the
earlier, less developed forms. These precursors are evidently performed with
rudimentary semantics and syntax. Little is known about them, and in the nature
 




© 2006 The Author
Journal compilation © The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2006
 
of  the case texts cannot be examined. But it is unlikely that the thinking child of
ages one, two and three is not using the medium of  language in some way. These
incipient forms of  inner speech are what I am referring to as the “me” stage. They
are early markers in the ontogeny of  inner speech.
Presumably the child will take a while getting used to this new faculty, but this
power will soon become the clearing house for all aspects of  the child. Desires,
fears, habits, and understandings will now come together in the newly cleared
field of  consciousness. This field will be organized by what is now the fully-formed
dialogical self, referred to by George Herbert Mead as the I-me relation and by
Charles Sanders Peirce as the I-you (the you being one’s immediately future self
as it is gradually approaching in the field of  time).
In this section I have shown that there is a kind of  history to the language of
inner speech. There may also be changes as people reach old age, but I do not
need that to make my point. My purpose in this section has been to show that
the history of  inner speech is important and should be studied along with system-
atics. In other words Saussure’s exclusion of  history in favor of  systematics does
not seem like a good strategy for understanding inner speech.
 
DIFFERENTIAL VS. REFERENTIAL THEORIES OF MEANING
 
The traditional linguistic theory of  word meaning is referential, i.e. words are
thought to refer to external objects or things, along with the ideas that represent
those things. Thus “cow” refers to actual cows along with a list of  properties that
characterize cows. Within this tradition there has always been controversy over
the nature of  universal ideas, e.g. nominalism vs. realism, but this is a sub-issue
against the more consensual background of  referential theory.
One of  Saussure’s most revolutionary innovations was to argue that words are
defined, not in relation to external objects or ideas about those objects but to the
other words in the language. He still worked with both words and ideas, referring
to them as signifiers and signifieds. But the signifieds or ideas were not generated
by external objects. They too were defined in relation to each other, with no
reference to extra-linguistic entities.
This is the differential as opposed to the referential theory of  meaning. Prev-
iously it had been thought that words were initially defined referentially, and then
the differential component, i.e. the relation to other words, operated as a supple-
mentary, contextual factor. Reference gave basic meaning, and context gave addi-
tional and more precise meaning. Saussure completely removed the referential
component and explained definition as entirely a matter of  relations among
words. Thus language was pictured as a self-enclosed system, explainable on its
own, with no need to refer to the external world. This was perhaps the single
most defining feature of  Saussurean linguistics as well as of  the larger structural
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The critics of  structuralism, many of  whom came from older versions of  literary
criticism, argued that the differential approach had fatal problems. It was unable
to explain language acquisition, change, translation, or ostensive definition (by
pointing). In addition it was circular and philosophically idealistic. But the struc-
turalists, despite the objections, stuck to their guns, and their theory was adopted
by the post-structuralists and deconstructionists. Such arguments as the death of
“man” and of  the author were spin-offs from the differential approach.
I think the differential approach is an over-statement, although context cer-
tainly does add to meaning. As Dell Hymes (1966, p. 45) put it, the question of
meaning “recalls De Saussure’s famous thesis that in language there are only
differences. In point of  fact, De Saussure probably did not hold that purely nega-
tive conception of  structure, but rather a view like that of  Pike, for whom features
are jointly contrastive and identificational.” Hymes’s “contrastive and identifica-
tional” are the same as my “differential and referential.”
The two sources of  meaning then seem to work together. When a previously
defined word is used in a sentence, the syntagmatic and paradigmatic axes, which
are the immediate context, impose additional meaning. On this view the context
can provide indispensable information about a word’s meaning, but it does so in
addition to, not instead of, a referentially defined meaning. The contributions of
the two flows of  meaning are each substantial and important.
It may also be true that the relative contribution of  the two sources of  meaning
varies from one type of  word to another. Relations would seem to be more differ-
entially defined than non-relations. And terms drawn from relationship clusters,
such as kinship systems or pieces in chess, would seem to be largely differential in
definition. On the other hand classifications of  ordinary biological species, e.g.
apples or frogs, would seem much more referential.
Given the two sources of  meaning, one might still ask if  the referential-
differential balance of  outer speech is about the same in inner speech. Whatever
the relation between the two semantic streams, is there any reason why this
relation would be different when we shift to inner language? I will argue that
inner speech is even more referential than outer speech in some respects, but also
even more differential in other respects. In other words its semantic system is
polarized between the differential and the referential.
Considering the peculiarities of  inner speech, I think its vocabulary would be
more differentially defined, i.e. more “structural”, than outer speech. First let me
recall the special qualities of  inner speech as silent, elliptical, embedded and
egocentric. These qualities make it relatively private, both in the words and their
meanings. And these privacy walls push things together, creating links and
dependencies among the words.
Let us take the analogy of  an intimate relationship, one that has some degree
of  deviance, with consequent secrecy. The mini culture of  the relationship tends,
due to secrecy, to be cut off  from society at large. This culture gets isolated. There
is the relationship time, the place, the transportation, the talk, the rituals, etc. The
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relationship elements are cut off  from the outside world, and they inevitably share
in that “relationship” feeling. They also imply each other, causally, sequentially,
symbolically, etc. The relationship meanings are defined more differentially than,
perhaps, items in a less deviant relationship. It is the privacy that melds things
together.
This internal language though is not only solitary and private, it is also much
more self  styled than outer language. Ordinary language has a smoothed over or
idealized version, which Saussure refered to as language or “langue.” And it also
has a more stylized, idiosyncratic version. This is its spoken variety, which Saus-
sure referred to as parole or speech. Parole is more heterogeneous than langue,
given that the speaking process reflects the unique mentalities of  individuals and
sub-cultures.
But by the same logic inner speech is even more individualized and heteroge-








, and both are different from purified or formalized language. But your inner
speech, given its elliptical, embedded and egocentric qualities, is even more
different from mine, and both are quite different from the outer langue. In other
words the gap between outer langue and inner speech is greater than that
between outer langue and outer speech.
The peculiarities of  inner speech are so stitched into the psyche, so personality-
dependent, that they differ considerably from person to person. This does not
seem to be primarily a reference-driven variation, for everyone’s inner speech has
roughly the same, generic world of  reference. The variation in the internal dia-
logue is largely due to the personal qualities of  the speaker, to that person’s
particular ego needs and short cuts.
We are little gods in the world of  inner speech. We are the only ones, we run
the show, we are the boss. This world is almost a little insane, for it lacks the usual
social controls, and we can be as bad or as goofy as we want. On the other hand
inner speech does have a job to do, it has to steer us through the world. That
function sets up outer limits, even though within those limits we have a free rein
to construct this language as we like.
There are similarities to the idealist world view in inner speech. The philosoph-
ical idealists, especially Berkeley, reduced the outer world to some version of  an
inner world. They internalized the external, each doing it somewhat differently,
as though it were all a dream. For them all speech would be inner, since there is
no outer. And since everything would be radiating from the self, everything would
be connected via the self.
The Saussurean theory of  linguistic differences, whether Saussure actually held
it or not, is very much like idealistic metaphysics. In both cases everything is
dangling from the same string. And some kind of  self  is pulling the string. The
late l9th century British idealists thought all of  reality was in relationship, and
given that they had only an inner world, they referred to these as “internal






© 2006 The Author
Journal compilation © The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2006
 
Saussure used this same phrase, internal relations, to refer to the differences
among signifiers and signifieds. And whether he was aligning himself  with the
idealists or not, there is a similarity between his self-enclosed linguistic world and
that of  the idealists. It is the denial of  reference, of  an external world, that under-
lies this similarity. For Saussure this denial is merely a theoretical move, an “as if ”
assumption, and not an assertion about the real world. The idealists said there
actually was no external world, and Saussure said he would pretend, for methodo-
logical reasons, that there was no external world. But regardless of  how they get
there, they end up in the same place.
If  there is no reference, no external world, then the only way language can be
defined is internally, by a system of  differences. Saussure’s purely differential the-
ory of  meaning follows from the loss of  the referential. But if  there is an external
world, even for inner speech, then we are back to the dualistic semantic theory,
i.e. to some sort of  balance between referential and differential streams.
Although inner speech is not idealism, in some ways it seems to be a more
differentially defined universe than outer speech. Linguistic context is even more
important than in outer speech. One reason is that meaning is so condensed on
the two axes. But a second is that inner language is so pervaded with emotion.
We censor our emotions in ordinary interpersonal speech, hiding our fear, our
shame, our jealousy, our gloating. It takes a while for little children to learn this,
but when they grow up they are all, men and women alike, pretty good at it. Inner
speech is another matter, for it is brutally honest. And its emotional life is anything
goes. We can scream, whoop and holler to ourselves. Or we can sob on a wailing
wall. In fact we probably emote more in inner speech to compensate for the
restrictions on outer speech. Emotions pervade large stretches of  inner speech,
and they heighten the importance of  internal relations.
The determinants of  meaning in inner speech seem much more stark and
unarguable than in outer speech. Inner speech is enclosed within us, and this
seems to make it a more dense set of  internal relations, both because of  the
intense privacy and the more spontaneous emotions. In these respects inner
speech gives a rich example of  Saussure’s differential meaning system.
On the other hand inner speech is also more obviously referential than outer
speech. Ordinary speech is quite conventional or arbitrary, and when we say dog
or apple pie, the sign has no resemblance to its object. In inner speech, though,
the signs are often images of  their objects, bearing an iconic or mirroring relation
to them. In other words, as mentioned before, there can be a heavy dependency
on sensory imagery in forming an internal sentence.
For example, my wife, a social worker, tells me she chooses what clothing to
wear in a way that is quite imagistic. “It’s a court day so I’ll wear a skirt, a black
one.” At this point her mind’s eye is scanning the hangers of  her clothes closet,





Here’s my new blouse, which I like, but it’s too bright. Maybe the beige or the
white would be safest. The blue isn’t washed. And easy on the accessories”.
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She reviews all these possibilities with imagery, not words, as she glances at her
closet. She selects by slowing down the scanning process and resting on a single
article of  clothing. Again no words needed. There is just the feeling of  attraction
or rejection. She can initiate this inner speech process with the word “dress,” do
the bulk of  it with the closet-scanning process, and then conclude it with “O.K.”
And she does all this, not while looking at her closet, but in bed the night before,
waiting to fall asleep.
The imagery, primarily visual but also tactile in this case, is dominating in the
inner language. These images function as various parts of  speech, but they also
function as signs of  external objects. They refer to the contents of  her closet. True,
the images of  clothing do have inter-relations. They give meaning, such as color
coordination, to each other. But they also refer to what is in the the closet, and
this referential meaning is powerful. For not only do the images resemble the
closet items, they also lead practically to the actual grasping and “putting on” of
those items. The whole point is to figure out what to wear, put it all on and then
go downstairs for breakfast and the paper. If  there were no reference, i.e. if  the
closet were empty, this daily routine would be meaningless, and she would not be
living in the real world (of  being a social worker, etc).
In conclusion Saussure’s theory of  semantics works well for some aspects
of  inner speech and quite poorly for others, i.e. the more referential ones. In
this section, as in the previous two, we are seeing that Saussure’s questions or
issues can cast a lot of  light on inner speech. They are well worth considering.
On the other hand inner speech is quite different from outer speech, and the
Saussurean issues must be handled in special ways. Inner speech is only partially





The last Saussurean idea to be considered is the distinction between parole or
speech and langue or language. Speech is the way people actually talk, as it
proceeds in the interaction order. Langue is an idealized or formalized version of
the way people actually talk, with standardized semantics, idealized syntax and a
purified set of  linguistic rules. “Language” is a simplified and academically more
approachable version of  speech. In this respect it has some resemblances with
Weber’s ideal types, which tried to get at the underlying meaning and tendencies
of  historical realities.
On the face of  it, it would appear that inner speech exists only in the form of
speech and cannot be rendered into the form of  “language.” Everyone speaks a
different dialect of  inner speech, and one could not reduce all this variation to
something smoothed over and idealized. And inner speech is too wispy and vague
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But we do go back to the same linguistic forms, over and over, in our inner
speech. So we must have a grasp of  the parole apparatus in some manner. In fact,
to be able to steer through the complex syntactical paths of  this inner world, we
also need some set of  rules or practices (or langue). The structures of  parole and
langue will be different from those in outer language, but there must be some
functional equivalents of  these structures for the inner speech process to proceed
at all.
If  we want to make the analogy to the multiple speakers of  external language,
however, some sort of  transformation will be necessary. There simply are not
multiple speakers of  our own inner speech but only ourselves. Saussure’s category
of  speech comprised the actual speech of  an indefinite number of  speakers. And
his language was some sort of  amalgamated version of  all these individual speak-
ers. So Saussure’s categories cannot be used as they are presently conceptualized.
But if  we remember that inner speech is imagistic as well as linguistic, a
principle of  differentiation is evident. This is in the elaborate batch of  imagist
materials we can use for parts of  speech. Since these are only loosely tied to the
meanings they might represent, they can vary quite a bit. I would suggest that
the words of  inner speech tend to be standardized and small in number, but the
imagery is less standardized and larger in number.
For example, I say to myself  “I’d like a hamburger.” There are only a few ways
we can say this in ordinary, outer language, but a large number of  ways in inner
language. To begin with I would drop the “I,” since we always do this in inner
speech. Then, instead of  saying “like” to myself  I can handle this meaning with
some emotional element. I allow myself  the feeling of  “liking” or “wanting,”
which substitutes for the word “like”. This feeling can come with various nuances
or degrees of  urgency. Then instead of  the word “burger” I can just picture one.
And this picture can have buns, condiments sticking out, etc, or it can even be
sizzling in a frying pan—along with sounds and smells. So I can say I want a
burger in inner speech without uttering a single linguistic word. And I can do so
in a large number of  individualized ways. This diversity then is the “parole,” and
the core meaning, the desire for a burger, is the “langue.”
There is a second way we can use the parole-langue distinction for inner
speech, which I will explain at greater length. To do this I will treat the
pronominal system of  inner speech, especially the I-you-me triad, as the formal
apparatus or langue. I will ignore the vocabulary and syntactical rules. This
pronominal scheme I will treat as a niche or circuitry or set of  channels within
which inner speech goes on. The pronouns are the saddle, and if  you want to
ride through this linguistic land you have to get on that saddle and inhabit the
pronouns.
I think the best example of  how this works is seen in watching a good movie.
Other aesthetic experiences may have some similarities with this one, but I will
emphasize film. If  the movie is effective enough one will yield to it and allow it
to enter the core of  one’s consciousness. If  this is done the viewer becomes totally
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absorbed by the movie and the movie seems to be going on within oneself. In
particular I think a strongly internalized movie enters the niche of  one’s inner
speech and seems to be oneself  talking to oneself.
Of  course one knows it’s “just a movie” as one usually does not know during
a dream. The viewer could always kick the movie out of  his or her consciousness
completely, or, not going that far, create some distance from the movie (e.g. by
“pinching” oneself ). The movie does not occupy one’s inner speech channels as
naturally and tenaciously as one’s own self  occupies them.
In addition the self  does not completely exit from the inner speech arena,
even though some exiting is necessary for there to be room for the movie. I
think the self  partially withdraws from this place and partially remains there.
This makes the experience one of  “split consciousness,” for the movie has been
allowed into this chamber, but the self  still remains there, on the periphery so to
speak.
If  the movie flounders, e.g. by slowing down, meandering, getting confusing or
losing plausibility, one might find it moving out of  that inner consciousness and
getting more distinctly external than before. We have now diminished our iden-
tification with the movie and placed it back in the category of  the other.
But if  the movie holds its grip on us, the whole thing is as though it were
happening within us, and, in a way, to us. The movie becomes our daydream,
and it goes in the place of  daydreams. Saying we are conscious of  the movie is
not enough. In a way the consciousness of  the movie is our consciousness. Normal
consciousness gets suspended or peripheralized, and movie consciousness
becomes us.
At the same time the split consciousness, with the self  still inhabiting inner
speech, allows the self  to carry on its own internal conversation parallel to the one
in the movie. For a movie requires constant interpretation, to fill in the gaps,
explain the seeming discrepancies, and contextualize the experience (perhaps by
comparing it to other movies). Even when totally absorbed by a movie the
processing and interrogating goes on. We still look at the movie from above and
use inner speech to figure it out.
Notice the movie characters may inhabit one’s pronouns (almost as actors
inhabit roles). But they do not use one’s inner vocabulary and syntax. In particu-
lar their speech is not abbreviated or sped up. They say the same things they say
in the movie, using speech patterns as anyone speaking in this language would do.
It is an outer language, then, being spoken in the arena (or on the “screen”) of
inner language. And of  course it’s not rushed into that ten to one ratio. A ninety
minute movie takes the full ninety minutes when we allow it in our inner con-
sciousness. Even though the self, in interpreting this movie, is moving at full inner
speech speed. In this way it resembles the way the self  gives a fast, running
commentary on the conversation when we are talking leisurely with other people.
One can also notice the usefulness of  Peirce’s “tuism.” This was his idea that
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inner conversation was between the I and the me, the latter being the self  as
an object or in the accusative case. It is possible to combine Peirce and Mead
into an I-you-me triadic conversation. But in relation to movies, it is obvious
that Peirce’s model is superior to Mead’s. Picture Clark Gable talking to Vivien
Leigh in 
 
Gone With The Wind
 
. The speaker, e.g. Gable, fits into Peirce’s I niche
fine, and the spoken to, e.g. Leigh, into his “you.” But if  one tried to shoehorn
these movie characters into Mead’s model, i.e. the I-me, there would be room
for the speaker all right but not for the person being spoken too. The speaker
(Mead’s I) would be talking to him or her self  (Mead’s me), and the movie
would consist entirely of  people talking to themselves. In other words Mead’s
model wouldn’t work for internalizing a movie or any other conversational
script. I think other art forms, especially the novel, might also inhabit the inner
speech niche.
There are probably other imaginative experiences that enter the inner speech
chambers and seem to be our natural consciousness. Probably many rituals, e.g.
political, patriotic or religious, can approach this status. And people who watch
athletic contests with intensity seem to have internalized these dramas.
But all I need to show is that outer events can sometimes seem like inner
speech, somewhat as parole can enter the arena of  langue. When this happens
the boundary between inside and outside is traversed. An external event seems
internal, which means a third person event has become first person. The identi-
fication has to be strong or the performance will remain at arms length. But once
intense identification begins, the outer consciousness permeates the inner. In parti-
cular the personal network, i.e. the I, you and me, that constitutes the core of  the
self, will be inhabited, at least partially, by these visitors. And it will seem real.
Not as real as the paranoid, who experiences completely unrealistic and
inappropriate fear. Or the schizophrenic hearing voices, which seem to be those
of  an outsider. I think these are cases where the gradual integration of  I with the
pre-existing me breaks down. These unfortunately disturbed souls are only me’s,
like the pre-historic humans may have been or the infant seems to be. And their
I’s are detached and outside their control, terrorizing them.
Still the reality of  these visiting consciousnesses, occupying the space of
inner speech as a parole occupies a langue, is strong enough to give us an out-
of-consciousness sort of  experience. In this sense I think we can say inner speech
is hospitable to Saussure’s parole-langue distinction, allowing for some redefini-
tion of  the key terms.
In the paper so far I have used Saussure’s approach to linguistics as a search-
light for examining inner speech. Given that inner speech is an offshoot or “dia-
lect” of  outer speech, Saussure is a useful model in many respects. But there are
several peculiarities of  inner speech that make Saussure an inadequate tool.
Figure 1 summarizes these findings.
Saussure’s binaries were meant to simplify the study of  language. The
paradigmatic-syntagmatic distinction showed two axes of  meaning, and it
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prepared the way for his differential theory of  meaning. The history-systematics
distinction was meant to justify the exclusion of  history. The speech-language
distinction was meant to get rid of  speech. And the differential-referential
distinction was meant to exclude reference. Saussure’s approach then is largely a
pruning device which chopped off  many traditional parts of  linguistics.
My analysis suggests that this pruning apparatus does not work for inner
speech. The two axes are useful but they do not prepare the way for the differ-
ential theory of  meaning. History cannot be excluded, for it is too important for
inner speech. Speech should be restored, and in fact langue applies only weakly
to inner speech. And that capstone of  Saussure and cultural studies, the differen-
tial theory of  meaning, does not seem adequate for inner speech. Referential
theory is also needed to make sense of  its meaning system.
Inner speech then is a distinct variation or dialect of  ordinary language, and
the characteristics I have pointed out seem to be central to its structure. But in
addition to revealing the contours of  inner speech this paper shows how far the
understanding of  this problem, especially in the social sciences, has come. A
couple decades ago the study of  inner speech in sociology was confined to Mead’s
I-me relation and little more. Mead gave almost no examples, and his main
concern was to differentiate the two conversational partners, the I and the me.
The study of  inner speech was stalled in discussions of  Mead’s theory of  self. Now
the structure of  inner speech is begnning to be understood, a host of  examples
are available to show its texture, and empirical research is beginning to appear
(especially that of  Archer, 2003 and forthcoming).
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It seems to me this paper shows inner speech as a highly researchable topic, both
theoretically and empirically. Toward this end I will briefly look at three issues:




Inner speech is quite similar to ethnomethodology in its use of
short cuts and normalizing practices. Garfinkel (1967) and Cicourel (1974) dis-
covered ethnomethodology by examining interpersonal or intersubjective com-
munication. A great many economies and condensations of  interpersonal
conversation are similar to ones we use when we talk to ourselves. If  I say to myself
“shop on the way home,” this is a condensation of  the fairly elaborate shopping
list I mentioned earlier, but if  I say to my wife “I’ll shop on the way home” she
may understand something much like that same, implicit shopping list. In other
words we are constantly using “etcetera clauses” to speed up our internal conver-
sations. And, being both communicator and communicatee, we may understand
these references even more accurately than we do in social conversations.
Sometimes etcetera clauses are used to cover up or evade some embarrassing
topic of  conversation. This has an inner speech counterpart in self  deception. If
you do not want your friend to know you got drunk at a party, you can say the party
was a “little wild” and just change the subject. But if  you do not want your self
to face the fact that you got drunk and embarrassed yourself, you can just say “I
was tired,” “I blew off  some steam” or more likely banish all thought of  the party
from your mind. In fact all the defense mechanisms of  psychiatry must operate
quite freely in inner speech just as they seem to do so in ordinary speech.
One of  the most powerful concepts of  ethnomethodology is normalization.
This refers to the practice of  reinterpreting some deviant act as, for example,
unintentional or jocular, and therefore normal. Large family gatherings often
generate insults among the guests with subsequent attempts to soften the blow. If
this is done effectively it breaks the social tension and restores the solidarity of  the
group.
The self  is also a sort of  family gathering with similar problems of  maintaining
and restoring solidarity. Much inner speech is a kind of  Durkheimian self  soothing
ritual where we try to convince ourselves that everything’s fine, even when it is
not. In this way we can comfort ourselves when we are frightened, restore some
pride when we are ashamed, or find a silver lining when we are disappointed.
Such expressions as “you can do it,” “you’re doing great,” and “this looks harder
than it is” give us confidence and energy when the going is tough.
In sum inner speech helps one see the importance of  ethnomethods. The
fact that we engage in these practices in our deepest privacy shows they are
rooted in our psychology as well as in our social life. And the fact that they run
parallel in intra- and inter-subjective communication shows them to be a feature
of  communication as such.
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The sealed off  privacy is another striking feature of  inner speech, making
it a language no outsider can have access to. This inaccessibility maintains the
highly private nature of  this language’s semantics and syntax.
In philosophy Wittgenstein provoked a widespread and complex discussion of
private language (1953, paragraphs 244–295; also Jones, 1971 and Candlish,
2003). By this he meant a language that is not only de facto but also inherently
private. No one but the private language user would be able to fully understand
it, even if  the meanings were publically available. To constitute a private language
such a tongue would not need to be completely private. If  only a single word
or sentence were inherently private, it would qualify as a private language in
Wittgenstein’s sense.
It seems to me inner speech is clearly a private language, at least in some of  its
utterances. This language is so rooted in the unique self  that an eavesdropper,
could there be one, would not fully understand it. It has so much of  one’s person
in it, a listener would have to be another you to follow it. And if  someone invented
a window into consciousness, a mind-reading machine, that could invade one’s
privacy, would they be able to understand the, now revealed, inner speech? I think
not. They might be able to understand most of  the words, but the non-linguistic
or imagistic elements would be too much a personal script to follow. If  this eaves-
dropper watched you, including your consciousness, for your whole life, had
access to your memory and knew your way of  combining non-linguistic represen-
tations with words, they might have your code, but this is another way of  saying
they would be another you. In practical terms inner speech would be inaccessible
in its meaning even if  it were accessible in its signifying forms.
Of  course this semantic privacy does not prevent one from describing one’s
own inner speech to another, at least to a substantial extent. Something is lost all
right in the translation from first to third person representations. When, in foot-
note 2, I talked about the inner speech cluster I called “Tom,” I obviously left out
some of  the affect and all of  the sensory imagery. But I was still able to commu-
nicate the gist of  it, in other words to transform first to third person meanings. So
even though this is a private language it can to some extent be made public and
used for research purposes.
The importance of  private language is that it sheds light on what a human
being is. We are inherently private animals, and we become more so the more
self-aware and internally communicative we are. This zone of  privacy may well
be the foundation for the moral (and legal) need people have for privacy. In any
case the hidden individuality or uniqueness of  each human being is closely related




One of  the thorniest problems of  the humanities and social sciences is
human agency. Humans are the authors of  their actions to a great extent, but the
way this process works is difficult to understand. I would suggest that inner speech
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Charles Sanders Peirce was under the impression that we guide our lives with
inner speech. We choose internally in the zone of  inner speech, and then we
choose externally in the zone of  practical action and the outer world. The first
choice leads to the second choice. Peirce even thought we could make and break
habits by first modelling them in our internal theater. Here we could visualize the
performance of  a particular action and also choose to perform this action (Cola-
pietro 1989, pp. 99–118). The visualization and the choice could give the energy
for designing and moulding one’s life.
Peirce may have overestimated the amount of  self  control that humans have,
but I think he was at least half  right. One striking example of  how this works is
in the cognitive therapy approach to psychological depression (Beck et al., 1979).
It seems that depressed people get stuck in a stream of  self  denigrating internal
communications. If  the person can break that string and introduce self-enhancing
communications, not unlike the internal rituals I mentioned earlier, it appears that
the depression can often be broken.
More generally the self  directing process, including planning, anticipating,
rehearsing, etc. seems to be largely a product of  inner speech. This includes both
what one will do and how one will do it. Picturing one’s preferred action as the
lesser evil or greater good, even if  one fudges a bit on the facts, is probably also
a powerful way of  producing a given action, and possibly even a new habit.
Undoubtedly there is more to self  control and agency than inner speech, but this




In this paper I examined inner speech with Saussure’s linguistic questions. I
showed that inner speech does not qualify as a public language, though it has a
distinct structural profile as a semi-private language or perhaps as a dialect. This
structure suggests the access points or research approaches that this language is
amenable to. As examples of  how this research might proceed I took a quick look
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 Here is my evidence of  this claim. I myself  use sensory and other physical imagery for
part of  speech in my inner speech. I asked several of  my theory buddies about this, and
they too think this way. And I asked the syntax expert, Derek Bickerton, and he said “I
think you are absolutely correct in thinking that images and other forms of  non-lexical




 I once knew a man named “Tom,” and he had the most engaging, trust-inspiring
smile. All he had to do was flash that smile, and I would believe anything he said.
The smile was so powerful I had to be betrayed about a half  dozen times before I got
the point. Then I realized the smile, sucker as I was for it, was a big lie and his major
weapon for getting what he wanted. Now, in my mental wanderings I sometimes
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